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Abstract: We estimate the impact of international child sponsorship on adult income and 
wealth of formally sponsored children using data on 10,144 individuals in six countries. To 
identify causal effects, we utilize an age-eligibility rule followed from 1980 to 1992 that 
limited sponsorship to children 12 years old or younger when the program was introduced 
in a village, allowing comparisons of sponsored children with older siblings who were 
slightly too old to be sponsored.  Estimations indicate that international child sponsorship 
increased monthly income by $13-19 over an untreated baseline of $75, principally from 
inducing higher future labor market participation.   We also find strong evidence for 
positive impacts on dwelling quality in adulthood, and modest evidence of impacts on adult 
ownership of consumer durables, limited to increased ownership of mobile phones. 
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1. Introduction 
Millions of households in wealthy countries support non-profit organizations whose aim is to 
alleviate poverty in the developing world. But only recently has a growing body of research in 
development economics begun to rigorously evaluate the impact of these programs on their 
intended beneficiaries.1  International child sponsorship is one of the most popular approaches 
taken by ordinary households in wealthy countries to help the poor overseas. We estimate that 
there are currently 9.14 million sponsored children in the world today, the vast majority of 
whom are sponsored by ordinary households in wealthy countries.2  Donors typically 
contribute $25-40 per month to sponsor a child. In many cases the organization uses these 
funds to provide school uniforms, tuition, nutritious meals, and programming that directly 
benefits sponsored children. Other types of sponsorship programs pool funds to invest in 
programming and infrastructure that benefits children in the community more broadly.3 
 For many individuals, child sponsorship represents their most direct contact with the 
poor in developing countries. Donors are drawn to child sponsorship because of the 
personalization of the relationship between sponsor and child.  But whether child sponsorship 
actually benefits sponsored children has remained an open question.  In Wydick, Glewwe, and 
Rutledge (2013), a companion paper to this research, we find international child sponsorship to 
have a statistically significant and positive effect on educational outcomes in all six survey 
countries (Bolivia, Guatemala, Kenya, Uganda, India, and the Philippines). Sponsorship during 
childhood increased the probability of secondary school completion by 12-18 percentage points 
over a 44.5% baseline, and increased completed years of schooling by 1.03-1.45 years. 
Sponsorship also increased adult white-collar employment by 6.5 percentage points over an 
18.5% baseline as well as the probability of being a community leader.  
Previous research has studied the impacts of various programs on children’s persistence 
in school in developing countries.  Examples include Drèze and Kingdon (2001) and Kremer 
and Vermeersch (2004) who find positive impacts of school meal programs on school 
                                                          
1 See for example Cristia et al. (2012) evaluating the One Laptop Per Child Program, Rawlins et al. (2014) on the 
nutritional impacts of dairy cows and meat goats donated via the Heifer Project, and the analysis of Blattman et al. 
(2012) on cash transfers. 
2
 We estimate this figure based on comprehensive internet search across multiple languages for sponsorship 
programs.  For details on how the 9.12 million figure was compiled, see Wydick, Glewwe, and Rutledge (2013).  
3 Of the top ten child sponsorship organizations, a more direct child-centered approach is taken by Compassion 
International, ChildFund, Children International, CFCA, and Bornefonden.  The community-centered approach is 
favored by World Vision, Plan International, Kindernothilfe, Save the Children, and SOS Children’s Villages. 
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attendance in India and Kenya, respectively.  In a randomized trial, Evans, Kremer and Ngatia 
(2008) find a nearly 40% reduction in absenteeism from the random provision of free school 
uniforms, while Kremer, Miguel, and Thornton (2009) estimate that a merit scholarship 
program for girls boosted attendance by 5 percentage points.  Aside from our research, the only 
other investigation specifically into the impact of international child sponsorship is Kremer, 
Moulin, and Namunyu (2003).  Here the authors assess the impact of a Dutch child-sponsorship 
program, finding that even a low-cost program focused on the provision of school uniforms and 
textbooks to each child caused sponsored children to advance a third of a grade farther in 
schooling completion. 
In this paper we present results for the impacts of child sponsorship on the adult income 
and wealth of children sponsored through one of the leading international child sponsorship 
organizations. An understanding of these impacts is important for the millions of individuals in 
wealthy countries involved in international child sponsorship, individuals who are likely to 
view their contributions as an investment in these overseas children that yields tangible 
economic returns in their adult future.  But it is also important for countries implementing 
similar programs that work directly with impoverished children, helping us to understand if 
direct investments in child development are financially sustainable by virtue of the positive 
impacts on future income of beneficiaries.  Thus we ask the question: Does international child 
sponsorship pay off for children in adulthood? 
2. Methodology 
Fieldwork for our six-country study took place from 2008 to 2010. We obtained initial 
enrollment lists from village projects that were rolled out from 1980 to 1992 by Compassion 
International, the world’s third largest sponsorship organization, which currently sponsors 
over 1.3 million children in 26 countries.  Compassion uses its funding to provide tuition fees 
for children, several nutritious meals per week, basic healthcare, and an after-school tutoring 
program.  The tutoring program not only helps children with homework and gives them some 
additional academic instruction, but emphasizes spiritual and character formation and the 
development of life aspirations in sponsored children.   
Compassion’s child sponsorship program is a very intensive intervention in the lives of 
impoverished children.  Children typically begin sponsorship at age 4-6 and continue into their 
mid-teens.  Many sponsored children attend retreats together with program staff that focus on 
the nurture of their values and aspirations.  Since even in a typical week children typically 
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spend about 8-10 hours per week after school and on Saturdays participating in the program, 
and because the average duration of sponsorship is 9.3 years, this means that during the course 
of their childhood, on average sponsored children spend slightly more than 4,000 hours 
participating in Compassion programming.   
 Through the use of local enumerators, we were able to locate 93.5% of the families of 
these formerly sponsored children, who by the time of the survey were aged 17 to 43. Our field 
personnel were unaffiliated with Compassion, so as to reduce bias in the responses of our 
subjects. We administered our survey first-hand to households pertaining to formerly 
sponsored children, a random sample of non-participating households in 19 program villages, 
and a random sample of households in 13 neighboring, non-program villages. The survey 
questionnaire was administered to family members (typically parents or adult siblings) present 
at the time of the survey, where survey questions obtained data from all grown siblings in the 
household cohort.  The same questionnaire was administered similarly to collect data from non-
sponsored siblings of sponsored children.  We also administered the survey to 50-75 randomly 
selected households with children in a similar cohort age that did not participate in the 
program in program villages and 50-75 randomly selected households with children in a 
similar cohort age in nearby non-program villages.  
Overall, our data contain information on educational and vocational outcomes, monthly 
wages, consumer good ownership, and dwelling quality on 1,860 formerly sponsored children, 
3,704 of their unsponsored siblings, 2,136 individuals of a similar age from non-participating 
families in villages where the Compassion program operated, and 2,444 individuals from 
similar, nearby villages without the Compassion program.   
There are several empirical challenges to estimating the program’s causal effects on 
future income and wealth. First, there may be non-random selection of households with eligible 
children into the program. Second, since a limited number of children per household were 
eligible for sponsorship (ranging from one in the African countries to three in the Latin 
American countries), intra-household selection of children for sponsorship may not be random.  
Third, there may be spillover effects from sponsored children onto their siblings, or onto other 
children in the village, which complicates the estimation.  Lastly, when estimating impacts on 
future wages, impacts on employment must be separated from impacts on wages, conditional on 
employment. 
To identify causal effects of child sponsorship, we use a program age-eligibility 
requirement, which stipulated that only children 12 and under could enter the program in any 
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year, including the program’s first year in a village.  Figure 1 shows the program’s strong 
adherence to this rule.  Because a child's age at the time of program rollout in his or her village 
is independent of adult life outcomes, except via its impact on program participation, the age-
eligibility rule can be an instrumental variable that allows one to account (and test) for non-
random intra-household selection of children for sponsorship.  To address possible endogenous 
household selection into the program, we employ household fixed effects, which control for 
unobserved differences in parenting behavior and household environments.4 Implicitly, this 
compares life outcomes of children who were age-eligible for sponsorship with their siblings 
who were too old for sponsorship when the program arrived in their village.   
The regression estimates allow for the possibility of spillovers. Dummy variables are 
included for: (a) Sponsored children, who were 12 or younger when the program started in 
their villages (denoted by T = 1); (b) Program participants’ siblings who were 12 or younger 
when the program began in their villages and, while eligible, were not selected for sponsorship 
(denoted   
    = 1); (c) Program participants’ siblings age 13-16 when the program arrived in 
their villages, and thus were ineligible (  
      = 1); (d) Individuals in non-Compassion 
households in program villages who were 12 or younger at program introduction (  
    = 1); 
(e) Individuals in non-Compassion households in program villages age 13-16 at program 
introduction (  
      = 1); (f) Individuals 12 or younger in non-Compassion villages when the 
program started in a neighboring village (  
    = 1); and (g) Individuals 13-16 in non-
Compassion villages when the program began in a neighboring village (  
      = 1). 
Individuals 17 or older in non-program villages are the omitted category.   
The household fixed-effects equation for child i in household j is 
          
          
       (    
      )        
          
      
        
          
                     (1) 
where     measures income or wealth,     is a vector of controls including age, gender, birth 
order and oldest child, and     is a household fixed effect. Assuming that spillovers: (a) occur 
only within villages; and (b) affect age-eligible, but not age-ineligible, siblings of sponsored 
children, then [     ]  [     ] captures spillovers from sponsored children onto non-
                                                          
4
 We found that program staff usually selected households for participation, and then parents chose which children 
to be sponsored. 
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sponsored siblings age 12 and younger and [     ]  [     ] captures spillovers onto age-
eligible children in non-Compassion households in program villages.5  
To address possibly endogenous child selection within families we use instrumental 
variable  estimation.  The oldest age-eligible sibling was sponsored most often, followed by the 
second-oldest age-eligible sibling, third oldest, etc., so the instruments are interaction terms 
between three age-at-program-rollout categories (4 years and under, 5-8, 9-12) and dummy 
variables for oldest age-eligible sibling, second-oldest age-eligible sibling, and younger age-
eligible siblings, yielding a vector of nine instruments.6  In the first stage, the probability of 
sponsorship,  ̂ , is estimated using these instruments and controls;  ̂  replaces the treatment 
variable (  ) in (1) in a second-stage regression.  
Estimating the impact of sponsorship on monthly wages involves another challenge: 
wages are unobserved for the 61% in the sample who were not employed.  This situation 
suggests the use of Heckman (1979) estimation for the wage impact regressions, which uses a 
probit employment equation to generate an Inverse Mills ratio for each observation in a 
second-stage wage regression. Given certain assumptions, this removes bias from the censored 
wage variable (the dependent variable in second equation). This two-equation system is then 
estimated using maximum likelihood.  
This approach allows one to decompose overall income impacts of child sponsorship 
into the impact from formerly sponsored children obtaining employment and the impact on 
wages conditional on employment.  These two effects are seen by differentiating the expected 
average wage,  ( ), where 
  ( )   (   )   (   ),      (2) 
and  (   ) is the probability that an individual works and earns a wage, based on 
characteristics  , and  (   ) is the individual’s wage, based on characteristics  . To estimate   
without assuming arbitrary functional forms,    should have one or more variables that are 
excluded from  ; we use the individual’s number of children, which strongly affects 
employment but should not affect wages. Both   and   include the sponsorship (treatment) 
variable, T. Differentiating (2) with respect to T, and setting all variables to their means, gives  
   
  ( )
  
  
  (   )
  
  ( ̅  )  
  
  
  ( ̅  )    (3) 
                                                          
5
 Spillovers onto non-sponsored siblings may reflect extra income available from sponsorship, role model effects, 
and parental reallocation of assistance to non-sponsored children. 
6 An identical set of instruments are used in Wydick et al. (2013). 
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The first term gives the impact of sponsorship on income from its employment effect; the 
second is the impact of sponsorship on wages, conditional on employment.   
Both terms in (3) are obtained using Heckman’s method;  (   ) is estimated using a 
probit specification, and  (   ) is essentially equation (1).  To calculate the standard errors of 
the employment effect (the first term in (3)), a bootstrapping procedure is used; estimates of  
  (   )
  
 and of the average wage are obtained from a random draw (with replacement) from the 
sample.  These two estimates are multiplied for each bootstrap iteration and (household-level 
clustered) standard errors are obtained from 500 bootstrapped replications.  Similarly, the 
impact of sponsorship on wages (the second term in (3)) is the product of the estimate of  
  
  
 
and mean labor market participation; for each bootstrapped sample (with replacement), the 
entire estimation procedure, which combines estimates of the probit equation with those of the 
wage equation, is implemented, and 500 replications are used to obtain correct standard errors. 
 For all 10,144 individuals in the study, interviewers attempted to obtain current 
monthly wages.  For 83%, they or their family members reported whether they received a 
salary and, if so, the monthly salary.  For the remaining 17% no one could provide salary data, 
but for nearly all of these individuals, family members knew their completed schooling and 
current occupation, if applicable.  Using data on education, occupation, gender and age (and 
country fixed effects), wages were imputed for all individuals in the sample.  Two estimates of 
income impacts from sponsorship were thus implemented; one drops the 17% of the sample 
without wage data, and the other imputes wage values on the full sample.7  Assuming that any 
imputation errors are independent of the explanatory variables in equation (1), estimates using 
imputed values are consistent and unbiased (Wooldridge, 2010).  To carry out extended 
estimations by country and gender we use the imputed wages, which yield slightly lower 
(yet more precise) wage impact estimates than do our directly reported wage data. 
To examine the impact of child sponsorship on adult wealth, we examine two broad 
categories: indicators of current dwelling quality, and current ownership of common consumer 
goods. The dwelling quality measures include the presence of an indoor toilet, electricity, walls 
constructed of sturdy materials (e.g. wood, concrete, rather than mud or sticks), high quality 
roofs (constructed from tile, concrete, or high-quality wood, rather than thatch, leaves, or low-
quality corrugated iron), and high quality floors (concrete, wood, or tile, rather than dirt floors 
                                                          
7 Those whose imputed wages are less than or equal to zero are assigned non-working status. 
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or floors made from other natural materials). For the second wealth proxy, information was 
collected on ownership of mobile phones, bicycles, motorcycles, automobiles, and land. 
To address issues of over-testing and joint-testing of related hypotheses, two types of 
indices were created. The first simply weights each of the five variables within a group equally; 
OLS and GMM IV estimations are then carried out on these simple indices. Secondly, for each 
of these two groups of variables we created an Anderson (2008) summary index.  This index is 
created by de-meaning each of the dependent variables in the respective group j  (j  dwelling, 
consumer goods), then weighting each observation by the sum of its row entries across the 
inverted variance-covariance matrix of the dependent variables in the group. Specifically, each 
observation i in group j receives a weight (index score) of   ̅   (   
   )  (        ), where 
1 is a m x 1 column vector of 1’s,     is the m x m inverted covariance matrix, and     is the m 
x 1 vector of outcomes for individual i. Relative to the simple index, the Anderson Index gives 
more weight to dependent variables within the grouping that are least correlated with other 
variables, and hence embody the greatest degree of unique information. 
3. Results 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the data. Monthly income is $16.67 higher 
among those who were sponsored as children (p < 0.01).  This mainly reflects a higher 
employment rate (54.5% to 47.9%) among formerly sponsored individuals (p < 0.01).   This is 
evident in Figure 2; conditional on positive wages, distributions of (log) income are nearly 
identical, but formerly sponsored individuals show dramatically more non-zero wages.  Figure 
3 illustrates the program’s impact in a discontinuity diagram; non-parametric estimation shows 
that wages are generally higher for individuals in untreated (relative to treated) households 
among those 13 and older when the program began.  However, among those 12 or younger 
when the program rolled out, income is higher in treated households. 
A) Impact on Income 
Heckman estimations are provided in Table 2 in columns (1) through (12). The first row 
of Table 2 gives marginal effects from selection into positive wage realizations from child 
sponsorship.  Column (1) gives estimates without household fixed effects and omitting missing 
wage observations, column (2) adds household fixed effects, column (3) uses household fixed 
effects with imputed wages, and column (4) provides the bootstrapped IV-Heckman estimates. 
These columns yield estimated coefficients of 0.087, 0.079, 0.068, and 0.186 for the marginal 
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effect of selection into employment.  All are significant at p < 0.01 except the latter which is 
significant at p < 0.05.  Hausman tests cannot reject the null hypothesis that the standard 
Heckman estimate is consistent (p = 0.136).  The second row provides estimates of 
  (   )
  
 
 ( ̅  ) in (3), the increased income from sponsorship via greater employment.  These impacts 
range from $12.81 per month in column (3) to $17.25 in column (1).   
The third row provides selection-corrected estimates of 
  
  
  ( ̅  ), the impact of 
sponsorship on wages conditional on employment. Only the $6.06 estimate in column (3) is 
significant (p < 0.05); the others in columns 1-4 are insignificant, and two are negative.  Over 
the whole sample there is weaker evidence that sponsorship raises incomes conditional upon 
employment, and the income impacts in the fourth row are insignificant except for the $2.64 
estimate (p < 0.10) in column (3). These estimates confirm the density functions in Figure 2—
the main impact of child sponsorship on income is primarily via increased employment, rather 
than via increased wages among those already employed in the overall sample.  Column 4 
reports estimates from an instrumental variables (IV) estimation in which we regress treatment 
on our vector of instruments and controls in the first stage and then carry out the Heckman 
estimation in the second stage, bootstrapping clustered standard errors at the household level 
for the entire process with 500 replications.  Our impact estimates with the bootstrapped 
IV-Heckman procedure increase to a monthly income impact of $35.31 (p < 0.05), yet a 
Hausman test still fails to reject the efficiency of the standard Heckman estimate (t = 1.49). 
In columns (5) and (6) we divide our standard Heckman estimations by gender, and find 
that while monthly wage effects from selection into employment are nearly identical ($12.60 for 
boys, $12.75 for girls, both p < 0.01), there is a positive impact on wages conditional on 
employment for boys ($6.74, p < 0.01), but this effect is zero for girls.  Thus sponsorship yields 
an increase in girls’ future wages of $12.75, resulting solely from greater labor market 
participation.  But the total wage impact from sponsorship on boys’ future wages is $19.34--
$12.60 from higher labor market participation and $6.74 from higher wages conditional upon 
labor market participation.     
Columns (7) through (12) in Table 2 show impacts of the employment selection effect 
from child sponsorship, replicating those in column (3) by country.  Impacts are highest in 
India ($37.61, p < 0.01), Guatemala ($27.63, p < 0.05), and the Philippines ($17.01, p < 0.10).  
And although estimates are positive in every country, they are moderate in Bolivia ($8.19, but 
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not statistically significant), and low and statistically insignificant in Uganda ($7.19) and 
Kenya.8     
We test for wage spillovers onto unsponsored siblings and other children of eligible age 
within program villages children using a joint test of the significance of the linear combinations  
[     ]  [     ] and [     ]  [     ] in (2), but find no evidence of either positive or 
negative spillover effects in either case (p = 0.987, 0.195, respectively).  Thus we conclude that 
the benefits of international sponsorship on adult income appear limited to the sponsored child. 
Figure 4 presents non-parametric estimations of the wage trajectories of sponsored 
(upper line) and unsponsored (lower line) individuals; the impact of sponsorship appears to 
increase over time.  While differences in wages are small in the twenties and thirties, they grow 
as individuals reach their forties. A similar non-parametric estimation in Figure 5 compares the 
wages of sponsored and non-sponsored children by maternal education.  Wage differences are 
lowest for both children of mothers without formal education and children of highly educated 
mothers.  The largest impact, about $25 per month, is among individuals whose mothers had 
completed only primary school. 
B) Wealth Impacts  
Finally, we consider the impact of child sponsorship on indicators of wealth in 
adulthood.  Individuals who were sponsored as children live in better houses as adults. Both the 
simple index and the Anderson index indicate significant impacts of sponsorship on adult 
dwelling quality.  Specifically, OLS (linear probability model) household fixed-effect estimates 
in Table 3 indicate that sponsorship  increases the probability that a home has electricity by 2.9 
percentage point, raises the probability of having improved walls by 2.5 percentage points, and 
increases having improved floors by 1.9 percentage points. GMM-IV estimates are smaller and 
insignificant for specific improvements, but larger and significant for both dwelling indices. 
Does child sponsorship increase consumer durable ownership in adulthood? The only 
asset with a statistically significant effect is the probability of owning a mobile phone, an 
increase of 5.4 percentage points in OLS estimations and 18.3 percentage points in IV 
                                                          
8
 Other estimation models yield similar estimates including Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), which over a variety of 
specifications, listwise deletion, and wage imputation yields significant (p < 0.01) whole-sample estimates ranging 
from $16.60 to $19.05.  While OLS captures both employment selection and marginal wage effects, it exhibits a 
downward bias because it omits the Inverse Mills ratio, included in the Heckman estimation, as a right-hand-side 
regressor. Tobit estimates, which are not preferred because they assume a homogeneous vector of explanatory 
variables for selection and marginal wage effects yield significant (p < 0.01) estimates between $12.53 and $24.51. 
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estimations (baseline of 76.8%). We find no evidence that sponsorship increased ownership of 
bicycles, motorcycles, vehicles, or land; coefficients on both wealth summaries are insignificant.   
Tests for household and village level spillovers show no significant effects on 
aggregated dwelling indicators (p = 0.237 and p = 0.523, respectively) or consumer durables 
(p = 0.333 and p = 0.536).  Although our research on educational impacts provides evidence for 
spillovers onto younger siblings, particularly in secondary school completion (Wydick, 
Glewwe, and Rutledge, 2013), we find no evidence of income or wealth spillovers in our data. 
4. Conclusion 
International child sponsorship is arguably the leading form of individual contact between 
ordinary people in developed countries with the poor in developing countries, yet little has been 
known about the impact of these programs on the economic outcomes in adulthood of  
sponsored children. Our more conservative Heckman estimates from a six-country study of 
10,144 individuals show that child sponsorship is responsible for increases in monthly income 
of $13-19 over an unconditional baseline of $75, or an increase of 17.3-25.3%.   This effect of 
child sponsorship on future wages is due principally to sponsored children entering the labor 
market as adults who would not have done so otherwise, particularly for girls.   We find that 
boys realize an added $6.74 of monthly income from higher wages conditional upon 
employment, but that this added impact on wages to be estimated at zero for girls.   
Given that the cost of sponsorship to sponsors was $28 per month during the time in 
the 1980s and 1990s when the individuals in our study were sponsored, and that the average 
length of sponsorship was 9.5 years, a monthly income increase of $13-19 over an average 
lifetime of work implies a modest financial rate of return to child sponsorship of 3.7-5.6%.   
Our estimations of impacts on wealth in adulthood find significant impacts on adult 
dwelling quality from child sponsorship on proxies for adult wealth, where we find that 
sponsored children are more likely as adults to live in better housing, homes with electricity, 
and with walls and floor made of superior construction. Impacts on adult consumer good 
ownership, however, are more modest and appear to be limited to substantially greater 
ownership of mobile phones. 
In other research we find that child sponsorship may improve adult incomes not merely 
through relieving external constraints that improve schooling access, nutrition, and health, but 
through addressing internal constraints related to imparting a greater level of hopefulness 
about the future and instilling greater aspirations for schooling and adult vocation.  Work 
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related to this research (Glewwe, Ross, and Wydick, 2013) on currently sponsored children finds 
a causal link between child sponsorship and elevated educational and vocational aspirations 
among children in Kenya, and finds higher levels of happiness, self-efficacy, and hopefulness 
based on a quantitative analysis of children’s self-portrait drawings in Indonesia.  Although it is 
yet impossible to definitively identify these increased aspirations as a causal channel to the 
positive impact from sponsorship on income and wealth we find in this study, what is clear is 
that child sponsorship increases aspirations and that child sponsorship also improves adult 
economic outcomes.  Yet taken together, these results suggest that development programs that 
relieve tangible external constraints, while simultaneously addressing the internal constraints 
faced by many among the poor, may realize stronger impacts than programs that address 
external constraints alone, thus providing a basis for interesting and important future research. 
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  Figure 1: Sponsorship as a Function of Age When Program Started 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Differences in Log Income, Sponsored vs. Unsponsored 
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Figure 3: Monthly Income as a Function of Eligibility  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Growth in Wage Gap Over Time, Sponsored vs. Non-Sponsored  
(Bandwidth = 1.0) 
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Figure 5: Wage Impact between Sponsored and Non-Sponsored 
 by Mother’s Education (Bandwidth = 0.5) 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Full Sample Sponsored Unsponsored Difference p-value 
Age 29.82 30.56 26.51 4.05 0.000 
Sex 0.504 0.481 0.509 -0.028 0.013 
Birth Order 3.041 3.006 3.049 -0.043 0.389 
Mothers Educ. (Years) 4.85 4.94  4.83 0.11  0.298 
Uganda 0.080 0.102 0.075 0.027 0.001 
Guatemala 0.167 0.192 0.162 0.030 0.002 
Philippines 0.141 0.129 0.143 -0.014 0.122 
India 0.159 0.119 0.168 -0.049 0.000 
Kenya 0.304 0.296 0.306 -0.010 0.418 
Bolivia 0.145 0.158 0.142 0.016 0.089 
Working = 1 0.491 0.545 .479 0.066 0.000 
Monthly Income 
($US) 
77.96 91.53 74.86 16.67 0.008 
Monthly Income 
($US), Working=1 
198.13 194.25 199.24 -4.99 0.649 
Monthly Income 
(Imputed, $US) 
90.63 104.13 87.62 16.51 0.000 
Monthly Income 
(Imp, $US), Working=1 
170.25 177.48 168.43 9.05 0.009 
Housing Quality  
Index (Simple) 
2.81 2.88 2.80 0.08 0.0143 
Consumer Good Index 
(Simple) 
1.26 1.25 1.27 -0.02 0.378 
Sample Size  10,011 1,819 8,192   
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Table 2: Impact on Monthly Income: Heckman Estimates 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Heckman 
Misg. Omt. 
No FE 
Heckman 
Misg. Omt. 
HH FE 
Heckman 
Obs. Impt. 
HH FE 
IV-Heckman 
Obs. Impt. 
HH FE 
Heckman 
All Obs Imp. 
HH FE--boys 
Heckman 
All Obs Imp. 
HH FE--girls 
Heckman 
Selection 
   
  (   )
  
 
0.096*** 
(0.017) 
0.079*** 
(0.0155) 
0.068*** 
(0.014) 
0.186** 
(0.080) 
0.063*** 
(0.023) 
0.073*** 
(0.022) 
       
Selection Impact 
on Income 
 
  (   )
  
  ( ̅  ) 
$17.25*** 
(3.12) 
 
$15.63*** 
(3.08) 
$12.81*** 
(2.71) 
$35.31** 
(15.33) 
$12.60*** 
(4.44) 
$12.75*** 
(3.90) 
       
Marginal  wage 
Impact | w > 0 
         
  
  
 
-$1.17 
(9.85) 
-$5.39 
(10.79) 
$6.06** 
(3.10) 
$10.23 
(15.21) 
$12.90*** 
(4.14) 
$0.43 
(4.62) 
Marginal  wage 
Impact on Income 
      
  
  
  (  ̅ ) 
-$0.46 
(4.02) 
-$2.12 
(4.25) 
$2.64* 
(1.38) 
$4.46 
(6.69) 
$6.74*** 
(2.21) 
$0.15 
(1.65) 
Lambda 
 
-18.85*** 
(3.94) 
-56.12 
(41.19) 
-10.55*** 
(3.60) 
-10.31 
(7.50) 
-5.41*** 
(1.71) 
-35.9*** 
(6.19) 
Observations 8,389 8,389 10,004 10,004 5,048 4,956 
Mean w, untreated $74.86 
(196.07) 
$74.86 
(196.07) 
$74.86 
(196.07) 
$74.86 
(196.07) 
$100.70 
(185.69) 
$47.54 
(114.82) 
Mean w | w > 0, 
untreated 
$199.24 
(278.47) 
$199.24 
(278.47) 
$199.24 
(278.47) 
$199.24 
(278.47) 
$201.89 
(220.71) 
$175.02 
(162.01) 
 
    BY COUNTRY: (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Selection Impact 
on Income 
 
  (   )
  
  ( ̅  ) 
Col. (4) OLS  
HH FE 
Uganda 
Col. (4) OLS 
HH FE 
Guatemala  
Col. (4) OLS 
HH FE 
Philippines  
Col. (4) OLS 
HH FE 
India  
Col. (4) OLS 
HH FE 
Kenya  
Col. (4) OLS  
HH FE 
Bolivia 
Sponsored $7.19 $27.63** $17.01* $37.61*** $1.61 $8.19 
 (7.82) (8.35) (9.54) (6.47) (3.57) (6.09) 
Observations 809 1,680 1,407 1,599 3,051 1,458 
Mean w, untreated $36.90    
144.30 
 $56.65    
104.66 
 $115.33    
253.02 
 $131.96    
167.22  
$31.22    
89.62 
 $57.73    
120.46 
Mean w | w > 0, 
untreated 
$154.99   
264.39 
 $193.34     
104.68 
$301.78     
333.85 
$198.28    
169.90 
$111.62    
140.65 
$165.36     
154.36 
Heckman estimations include controls for age, gender, sibling order, and oldest sibling.  Selection on 
Impact multiplies marginal effect of first-stage tobit by E[w | w > 0] for sample ($178.07).   First-stage 
F-test for instrumental variable estimation yields F = 95.82 (p < 0.001).  Hausman test for efficiency of 
Heckman vs. IV Heckman fails to reject null of non-instrumented Heckman efficiency (p = 0.1363). 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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  Table 3: Impact on Wealth 
 
--------------------------------Dwelling Quality --------------------------------- 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES indoor 
toilet 
electricity 
in home 
improved 
walls 
improved 
roof 
improved 
floor 
Simple 
Dwelling 
Index 
Anderson 
Dwelling 
Index 
OLS, Household FE:        
Sponsored 0.009 0.029*** 0.025** 0.004 0.019** 0.082*** 0.034* 
 (0.006) (0.007) (0.012) (0.006) (0.009) (0.017) (0.020) 
Observations 9,477 9,490 7,863 8,554 8,614 10,004 10,004 
R-squared 0.006 0.008 0.011 0.004 0.012 0.013 0.009 
        
GMM-IV, Household FE:        
Sponsored -0.017 0.041 0.006 -0.001 0.070 0.232** 0.192* 
 (0.028) (0.035) (0.049) (0.030) (0.049) (0.093) (0.106) 
Observations 9,477 9,490 7,863 8,554 8,614 10,004 10,004 
 
-------------------------------- Consumer Durables --------------------------------- 
 
 (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
VARIABLES mobile 
phone 
owns 
bike 
owns 
motorcycle 
owns 
car 
owns 
land 
Simple 
Consumer 
Index 
Anderson 
Consumer 
Index 
OLS, Household FE:        
Sponsored 0.054*** 0.015 0.010 -0.000 0.003 0.089*** 0.003 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.025) (0.029) 
Observations 9,884 9,856 9,906 9,880 9,444 10,004 10,004 
R-squared 0.047 0.044 0.036 0.023 0.047 0.097 0.047 
        
GMM-IV, Household FE:        
Sponsored 0.183*** 0.004 0.019 0.000 -0.006 -0.004 0.024 
 (0.055) (0.052) (0.040) (0.036) (0.046) (0.128) (0.145) 
Observations 9,883 9,856 9,906 9,880 9,444 10,004 10,004 
R-squared 0.085 0.060 0.106 0.029 0.063 0.149 0.077 
Regressions include controls for age, gender, and sibling order.  OLS and IV estimations incorporate household 
fixed effects. ).  First-stage F-test for instrumental variable estimation yields F = 95.82 (p < 0.001).  Clustered 
standard errors at the household level in parentheses. 
  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
